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COMMENTS
ROBOTICS IN THE WORKPLACE: THE
EMPLOYER'S DUTY TO BARGAIN OVER ITS
IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECT ON THE
WORKER
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Labor Relations Act section 8, subdivision (d), 1
states that an employer and the representative of the employees have
a mutual obligation . .. to confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment ....
Those subjects deemed by the National Labor Relations Board8 and
the courts to encompass "terms and conditions of employment" are
commonly referred to as mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.4
An employer's failure to bargain concerning a mandatory subject is
deemed an unfair labor practice by the NLRB and is a violation of
section 8(a)(5)' of the NLRA.
There is an inherent tension between labor unions and employ-
ers as to whether there is a need to bargain at all. The union prefers
0 1984 by Debra J. Zidich
1. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976) [here-
inafter cited as NLRA or Act].
2. Id.
3. Hereinafter cited as NLRB or Board.
4. R. GORMAN, BAsic TEXT ON LABOR LAW 496 (1976).
5. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976) states: "[It
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of § 9(a)." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
Section 159(a) declares that the union selected by a majority of employees in an appropriate
bargaining unit shall be the exclusive spokesperson "in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment or other terms and conditions of employment." Id.
The term "bargaining unit" refers to an employee group which is united by a community
of interest. This "community of interest" is determined by the National Labor Relations Board
by evaluating employees in terms of such factors as similarity in kind of work performed;
similarity in qualifications, skills and training; similarity in employment benefits, hours of
work, etc. Once established, this bargaining unit is allowed to choose a representative who
negotiates with the employer during collective bargaining sessions in which the provisions of a
contract are worked out. For a further discussion of the significance and process of selecting
the appropriate bargaining unit, see R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 66-92.
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to discuss all topics requiring decisions that would directly or indi-
rectly affect workers within its bargaining unit. Management, on the
other hand, seeks to retain as much unilateral control of its decisions
as possible in order to avoid costly delays and concessions and to
maximize productivity. Reconciliation of these two opposing forces
is necessary when robotics7 are introduced into the workplace. Since
robotics are used to replace human workers performing specific
tasks, the direct effect of the employer's decision to implement robot-
ics would be lost jobs for those displaced within the bargaining
unit-a topic of great concern to labor.
This comment analyzes and balances the competing interests of
labor and management and determines whether the employer has a
good faith duty to bargain with the union over the decision to imple-
ment robotics. No previous cases have dealt directly with this contro-
versy. Therefore, analogous cases that have had an impact on job
security-those concerning decisions to subcontract, relocate, auto-
mate or to partially terminate a business-will provide a legal
framework in which to evaluate the amenability of the subject of
robotics to mandatory collective bargaining. After applying the anal-
ysis utilized in the analogous cases to an employer's decision to im-
plement a robotics system, this comment concludes that the employer
does not have a mandatory duty to bargain with the union over this
decision. Finally, this comment questions whether this is the correct
result, and suggests that the employer should be required to bargain
over the effects of this decision on the bargaining unit.
6. The congressionally-mandated process of collective bargaining may be viewed
essentially as a compromise between two antithetical and immoderate ap-
proaches to the respective roles of public duty and private right. On the one
hand, the bargaining process is designed not to interpose government as the
central actor in labor relations, but rather to preserve intact the liberty of the
parties to agree by themselves on the substantive terms governing their interac-
tion. On the other hand, collective bargaining was seen by the Congress that
enacted the NLRA as a rejection of an excess of private economic freedom, an
excess which was considered to pose a substantial danger in the setting of our
modern, highly independent economy.
Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 731 (3d Cir. 1978).
See generally Aaron, Dispute Settlement: The Grievance Procedure and the Role of Vol-
untay Arbitration, reprinted in LABOR IN A CHANGING AMERICA 211, 213-14 (W. Haber
ed. 1966).
7. See infra notes 8-24 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Robotics: Current Existence and Future Impact
One hundred and fifty years ago the human race began its love/
hate relationship with the machine during the Industrial Revolution.
This tenuous relationship dramatically altered the ways that people
lived and worked. Overall, however, the positive aspects of this rela-
tionship eventually produced a so-called "second Industrial Revolu-
tion" with the development of the "microprocessor." The use of the
microprocessor to automate production functions was epitomized by
the development of the robot.' This programmable automation im-
proves profitability because it replaces an average of two to three
humans per robot.10 A fully-equipped robot costs approximately
$75,000, and performs at ninety-five percent efficiency for eight
years (depreciation rate period); two workers for the same period
would cost at least $250,000.1 Currently 22,000 robots are in use
worldwide, with 5,000 of those being utilized in the United States."2
Sales are predicted to rise at a rate of thirty-five to fifty percent a
year, and by 1990 the United States could have 100,000 to 150,000
robots with annual sales topping $2 billion.13 It is estimated that the
use of robots in the United States will eliminate 100,000 to 200,000
jobs by 1980 '4 and 30,000 to 50,000 (thirty to forty percent) of these
8. Levitan & Johnson, The Future of Work: Does it Belong to Us or to the Robots?, 105
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 10, 11 (1982).
9. Id. at 10.
10. Turner, When the Robots Punch In, 47 THE PROGRESSIVE 22, 23 (1983).
11. Id.
General Dynamics says its robots each do the work of three or four employees.
And General Motors finds that a $50,000 robot can be operated at one-third the
hourly cost of a skilled worker. Robots pay for themselves in three years or less
and do the work of anywhere from 1.7 to 6 men and women.
Hearings on Robotics and Unemployment, 112 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 250, 251 (1983)
(statement of Sen. Lloyd Bentsen to the Joint Economic Committee).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Projections in Growth of Industrial Robot Use, 113 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 74, 75
(1983) (statement of H. Allan Hunt, W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research).
Another commentator noted:
A study conducted at Carnegie-Mellon University asserts that the current gen-
eration of robots has the technical capability to perform nearly seven million
existing factory jobs-one-third of all manufacturing employment-and that
sometime after 1990, it will become technically possible to replace all manufac-
turing operatives in the automotive, electrical-equipment, machinery, and
fabricated-metals industries.
Levitan & Johnson, supra note 8, at 11.
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jobs are expected to be in the auto industry alone. 5 Thus, the unem-
ployment impact of industry implementation of robotics is most
likely to be felt by those workers who are least skilled and who are
most likely to be represented' 6 by trade unions. 7
There are two important reasons why robotics differ from other
types of new and increasingly-available technology such as com-
puters. The first is that computers do not replace workers, but
rather do jobs that humans cannot.' 8 Secondly, the reproductive ca-
pacity of robots-the prospect of robots building robots-is a techno-
logical potential which would have a tremendous impact on the
worker.'" Usually, when an industry mechanizes and displaces
workers, new jobs are created in another area." This is initially
what would happen in the case of robotics. New jobs would be cre-
ated building and producing robots until robots could be program-
med to perform this function themselves. Thus, the long-term effect
of robotics would be the unemployment of a large number of un-
skilled or semi-skilled workers who literally could not be absorbed
into the existing employment environment primarily because of their
15. Ford and General Motors alone may utilize a total of 30,000 robots by 1990. Hear-
ings on Robotics and Unemployment, 112 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 250, 251 (1983) (statement
of Sen. Lloyd Bentsen).
16. There are, however, companies whose low-skilled workers are not unionized. Atari
Corporation, a producer of electronics systems located in California's Silicon Valley, is an
example of such a company. In 1983, its employees voted against union representation. Subse-
quently, Atari laid off 1,700 of its workers and transferred their jobs to Asia where labor is
less expensive, thus reducing overall production costs. Presently, those employed in the "high
tech" industries who possess greater technical skills are enjoying a job boom. See Karmin,
High Tech: Blessing or Curse, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 38, 39-43 (Jan. 16, 1984).
However, as robots become more sophisticated, even these more highly-skilled workers will
eventually be replaced. Ironically, those individuals currently helping to produce the
microprocessor and other related technology used in robotics can be seen as manufacturing the
seeds of their own eventual job destruction.
17. Projections in Growth of Industrial Robot Use, 113 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 74, 75
(1983). There will, however, be an increased demand for more technically trained workers
primarily in the areas of robot maintenance and repair. Id. Also, "[Tihe Bureau of Labor
Statistics says 800,000 jobs will be created in this decade to produce robots, and the National
Bureau of Standards projects that every new robot will create from two to four man-years of
work somewhere in the economy." Hearings on Robotics and Unemployment, 112 LAB. REL.
REP. (BNA) 250, 251 (1983).
18. Robotics in Industry, 112 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 331, 332 (1983) (statement of
Joseph Kenowe, Director of Industrial Trades Division, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters) (emphasis added).
19. Levitan & Johnson, supra note 8, at 12.
20. For example, displaced workers ideally could find employment in a plant helping to
produce the new types of machines which had initially displaced them. Thus one industry
would, in effect, give rise to another thereby either maintaining or increasing the number of
available jobs. See Albus, Robots in the Workplace, THE FUTURIST 22, 26-27 (Feb. 1983). See
also Coates, The Potential Impact of Robotics, THE FUTURIST 28-31 (Feb. 1983).
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lack of technical training.21
In order for American employers to stay in business and per-
haps even turn a profit,22 the increased productivity potential of
robotics may provide the only means to remain competitive with ri-
vals who use low cost foreign labor.2 Also involved in this issue are
the labor unions who see the impact of'robotics as a major source of
worker displacement.2 4 Bringing these two opposing factions together
is the purpose of collective bargaining under the National Labor Re-
lations Act.
B. Legislative History and Purpose of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act Section 8(d)
The National Labor Relations Act was enacted in 1935 and has
been amended, several times. 5 The second amendment, the Labor-
21. Addressing the philosophical, social and political ramifications of robotics is well
beyond the scope of this comment. It is mentioned here, however, to point out the seriousness
and extent of the problems which the implementation of robotics technology will cause and
why robotics is a current topic of heated debate. For an analysis of current and future impact
of technology on the worker and the working environment, see U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH-
NOLOGY ASSESSMENT, AUTOMATION AND THE WORKPLACE (1983). For a more in-depth and
comprehensive look at this same topic, see also U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-
MENT, COMPUTERIZED FACTORY AUTOMATION: EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION AND THE
WORKPLACE (1984). See generally INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, NEW TECHNOLOGIES:
THEIR IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT AND THE WORKING ENVIRONMENT (1982); and AUTOMA-
TION AND INDUSTRIAL WORKERS (j. Forslin, A. Sarapata, A. Whitehill eds. 1979).
22. See generally U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 44 (Jan 16, 1984) (interview with
James Baker, Executive Vice President of General Electric Co.) (discussion of positive and
negative effects of automation on American industry). Mr. Baker states that "[T]he choice that
confronts American industry is to automate, emigrate or evaporate." Thus, in order to reduce
costs and remain competitive, American employers must not only utilize robotics in the manu-
facture of their products, but they must avoid purchasing expensive imported robots. They
must develop the technological methods to manufacture these systems domestically. The Japa-
nese, for example, have already implemented robotics systems extensively in their own manu-
facturing industries and are a major producer/exporter of robots world-wide. See Tanakadate,
The Robots Are Coming and Japan Leads the Way, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 46 (Jan.
18, 1982); and Nicholson, Willensen & Doi, Robots: Japan Takes the Lead, NEWSWEEK 92
(Sept. 21, 1981).
23. See Workers and Automation, TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 83 (Feb.-Mar. 1983).
24. "Some unions are stressing the need to use robot-created wealth to offset robot-
created unemployment. The International Association of Machinists has drawn up a 'reindus-
trialization' program, to be introduced in Congress soon, that proposes a 'robotics tax' and
other means of recapturing private windfalls for social investment." Turner, supra note 10, at
24.
25. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935),
amended by ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), ch. 534, Pub. L. No. 189, 65 Stat. 601 (1951), Pub.
L. No. 85-791, 72 Stat. 945 (1958), Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 541 (1959), Pub. L. No. 93-
360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974).
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Management Relations Act of 1947,6 states that the purpose of the
Act is to promote the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes.2
This is to be accomplished through the use of the collective bargain-
ing process whereby negotiations take place between employers and
employee representatives regarding the provisions of their contract. 8
When enacting this legislation, the House rejected a proposal to limit
the mandatory bargaining subjects under section 8(d) to a specific
statutory list.2 9 Instead, Congress decided that the appropriate sub-
jects for mandatory collective bargaining under this section should be
determined in the first instance by employers and the union, and
then by the NLRB and the courts.30 The importance of classifying a
subject as either mandatory or permissive is that mandatory subjects
must be discussed in good faith by the employer and the union until
an agreement is reached or an impasse occurs."' Failure to bargain
over a mandatory subject, or lack of good faith by the employer is
violative of the Act, and the employer is considered to have commit-
ted an unfair labor practice. 2 But an employer need not bargain
forever. If an impasse occurs after good faith deliberations have
taken place, the employer is free to make a unilateral decision that
would not constitute an unfair labor practice.33 Conversely, permis-
sive subjects of bargaining need not be discussed at the bargaining
table, and one party may not compel the other to address it as a
condition of executing a collective bargaining agreement.3 4 There-
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). The Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act is also known as the Taft-Hartley Act.
27. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, 151, 61 Stat. 136 (1982) (declaration of policy set forth in §§
I and 101 of the Labor-Management Relations Act 1947).
28. Id.
29. H.R. REP. No. 3020 § 2(11), 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1974) (as reported), reprinted
in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 1947 at
31, 36 (1948).
30. See H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947 (1948).
31. An impasse is a deadlock between two parties to a negotiation where neither side is
willing to compromise on an issue. R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 498.
32. This would be a violation of § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. See supra note 5. The usual
remedy issued by the Board to rectify this unfair labor practice is an order to the wrong-doer
(employer or union) to cease and desist from its illegal conduct and to begin to bargain in good
faith. R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 532.
33. R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 522. See generally Fleming, The Obligation to Bar-
gain in Good Faith, 47 VA. L. REV. 988 (1961) (examining the scope of mandatory bargain-
ing subjects and the role of governmental intervention in the bargaining process, with respect
to voluntary demands).
34. Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 726 (3d Cir. 1978). See also R.
GORMAN, supra note 4, at 498. This case said: "Non-mandatory or 'permissive' provisions
deal with subjects other than wages, hours and working conditions ... either party may pro-
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fore, categorizing a subject as mandatory benefits the union to the
extent that no action in this area can be taken by the employer with-
out first consulting the union. In essence, this increases the union's
power to influence those decisions. This categorization burdens the
employer however, as it reduces his or her power to unilaterally
make decisions regarding his or her business. In the past, the Board
and the courts have included broad and diverse topics 5 as mandatory
subjects of bargaining.
The primary question for discussion is whether employee termi-
nation resulting from the implementation of robotics should be con-
sidered a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. As mentioned
previously, because there have been no cases dealing with this topic,
the starting point for resolving this complex and controversial issue is
the examination of past cases which have also dealt with employee
terminations and job displacement. These cases involve employer de-
cisions to subcontract, relocate, automate, and partially terminate a
business.
III. THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK: PAST DECISIONS OF
THE NLRB AND THE COURTS
A. Contracting Out and Subcontracting Existing Unit Work
When an employer decides to "contract out" or to subcontract
work which is presently being performed by union employees, he or
she is seeking to replace these union workers with employees of an-
other company that can complete the work more cheaply in the hope
of reducing labor costs.3" The NLRB and the federal courts have
previously reviewed subcontracting cases to determine whether the
decisions to contract out should be a mandatory topic of discussion
during collective bargaining.37
Early in the history of subcontracting cases, the landmark case
of Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB 8 was decided by the
pose such a provision, but neither party is obligated to discuss it and neither party may insist
to an impasse that such a provision be incorporated in the contract." Id.
35. For a fairly comprehensive overview of past subjects which have been held as
mandatory for collective bargaining, see Brockway, 582 F.2d at 726 nn.23-39 and accompany-
ing text (1978). See also Emporium-Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420
U.S. 50 (1975) (elimination of discrimination) and R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 496-523.
36. The decision to use robotics is analogous to the decision to subcontract, because in
both decisions, the effect is to replace one set of workers with another-whether it be robots or
workers from another company-thereby reducing the employer's labor costs.
37. For an overview of these cases, see R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 509-15.
38. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
1984]
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United States Supreme Court. Fibreboard concerned that company's
decision to effect a cost savings by contracting out its maintenance
work formerly done by union employees. 9 The court of appeals af-
firmed the NLRB decision which held that -the employer in this case
had a mandatory duty both to bargain with the union over its deci-
sion to subcontract and over the effect of its decision on the bargain-
ing unit.40 The Supreme Court agreed."'
The employer company in Fibreboard had argued that because
its decision to subcontract was economically motivated, 42 the decision
was excluded as a subject for mandatory bargaining." The Court in
Fibreboard gave several reasons for rejecting the employer's argu-
ment. The first reason was that termination of employment would
result from the contracting out of work performed by members of the
established bargaining unit,"' and therefore this subject matter was
well within the phrase "terms and conditions of employment."" 5 The
second reason was that the inclusion of "contracting out" within the
statutory scope of collective bargaining seems well designed to effec-
tuate the purposes of the NLRA.'" As mentioned previously, one of
the primary purposes of the Act is to promote the peaceful settlement
of industrial disputes by subjecting them to the mediatory influence
of negotiation.4 Thus, making subcontracting a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining resolves labor-management disputes within the
framework established by Congress as most conducive to industrial
peace. 48 The third reason was the fact that voluntary collective bar-
gaining over subcontracting decisions is prevalent throughout indus-
try and that bargaining in this area has been highly successful4 9 in
achieving peaceful accommodations of the conflicting interests.50
39. Id.
40. East Bay Union of Machinists v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
41. 379 U.S. 203.
42. If the decision to subcontract had been based on union animus;this would have been
considered an unfair labor practice. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 140
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976) provides "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer ...(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."
43. 379 U.S. at 206.
44. Id. at 210.
45. Id. at 210 (quoting Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co., 362
U.S. 330 (1960)).
46. 379 U.S. at 210-11.
47. Id. at 211 n.4.
48. Id. at 211.
49. See generally Lunden, Subcontract Clauses in Major Contracts, 84 MONTHLY
LAB. REV. 579, 715 (1961).
50. 379 U.S. at 214.
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The Court then articulated a three-part test to determine the
propriety of submitting the present dispute to collective negotiation. 1
A company must bargain with the union over subcontracting deci-
sions if: (1) the decision to contract out does not alter the company's
basic operation; (2) no capital investment is contemplated; and (3)
the employees of the independent contractor are to do similar work
under "similar conditions of employment" as the employees whom
they replaced."' Since all three criteria existed in the Fibreboard sit-
uation, the Court held the employer had a duty to bargain with the
union over its decision to subcontract."
The Court nevertheless warned that its reasoning should not be
used to expand the scope of mandatory bargaining to include all
types of subcontracting decisions." ' This caveat was also discussed in
the concurring opinion in Fibreboard, and becomes particularly im-
portant when considering the robotics job security issue. In his con-
currence, Justice Stewart stated that in the past, the NLRB and the
courts had recognized employment security in various circumstances
as a "condition of employment" and therefore it is a subject of
mandatory bargaining.5 Not every decision which affects job secur-
ity, however, is one which requires bargaining." Justice Stewart
noted that decisions concerning investment in labor-saving machinery
and commitment of investment capital, are strictly entrepreneurial in
nature-as opposed to terms and conditions of employment-and
therefore are completely outside the scope of mandatory collective
bargaining. Thus, he emphasized that Fibreboard should in no way
be viewed as requiring an employer to bargain in these areas even
though the effects on employment may be tremendous.57 The concur-
ring Justice concluded, however, that the proper forum for resolution
of disputes concerning technological change and its effect on the
51. Id. at 213.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 215. Justices Douglas and Harlan joined in the concurring opinion by Justice
Stewart.
54. We are thus not expanding the scope of mandatory bargaining to hold, as we
do now, that the type of "contracting out" involved in this case-the replace-
ment of employees in the existing bargaining unit with those of an independent
contractor to do the same work under similar conditions of employment-is a
statutory subject of collective bargaining under § 8(d). Our decision need not
and does not encompass other forms of "contracting out" or "subcontracting"
which arise daily in our complex economy.
Id.
55. Id. at 233 (Stewart, J., concurring).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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worker is the legislature and not the courts."
1. The Fibreboard Implication: Robotics v. Subcontracting
Robotics is a type of "labor-saving machinery" involving the
"commitment of investment capital." Therefore, following the con-
curring opinion in Fibreboard, an employer's decision to purchase
robots would be strictly a managerial and entrepreneurial decision
and would not require bargaining despite its effects on job security.
Under the three-part test established by the Fibreboard major-
ity, however, the decision to use robotics comes closer to being a re-
quired collective bargaining subject. The third criterion would be
satisfied because robots would engage in the same or similar work
under similar "conditions of employment" as the employees whom
they replaced. However, the remaining two criteria would arguably
not be met. Under the first criterion, the decision to employ robots
instead of workers would alter the company's basic operation or
scope of enterprise. Although the nature of the employer's business
would not change, its entire method of production would undergo a
complete transformation, thus altering its operations to a great ex-
tent." Moreover, the second criterion of the Fibreboard test for deci-
sion-bargaining would not be satisfied because capital investment is
contemplated by the decision to purchase and to implement robots.
Subcontracting decisions and decisions to implement robotics are
intended to reduce labor costs-and bargaining collectively over re-
58. This kind of subcontracting falls short of such larger entrepreneurial ques-
tions as what shall be produced, how capital shall be invested in fixed assets, or
what the basic scope of the enterprise shall be. In my view, the Court's decision
in this case has nothing to do with whether any aspects of those larger issues
could under any circumstances be considered subjects of compulsory collective
bargaining under the present law.
I am fully aware that in this era of automation and onrushing technological
change, no problems in the domestic economy are of greater concern than those
involving job security and employment stability. Because of the potentially cruel
impact upon the lives and fortunes of the working men and women in the Na-
tion, these problems have understandably engaged the solicitous attention of
government, of responsible private business, and particularly of organized labor.
It is possible that in meeting these problems Congress may eventually decide to
give organized labor or government a far heavier hand in controlling what until
now have been considered the prerogatives of private business management.
That path would mark a sharp departure from the traditional principles of a
free enterprise economy. Whether we should follow it is, within constitutional
limitations, for Congress to choose. But it is a path which Congress certainly did
not choose when it enacted the Taft-Hartley Act.
Id. at 225-26 (Stewart, J., concurring).
59. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
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ductions of labor costs has been successful in the past. 60 However,
under the criteria articulated in Fibreboard, the decision to imple-
ment robotics would not be a mandatory subject of collective bar-
gaining because it necessarily involves a managerial decision con-
cerning capital investment and because it alters the basic operation
and scope of the employer's enterprise.
2. The Fibreboard Progeny
NLRB decisions after Fibreboard have promulgated additional
factors to be evaluated when considering the duty to bargain over
decisions to subcontract. In Westinghouse Electric Corporation,61 the
NLRB held that the employer did not have a duty to bargain over
thousands of subcontracts relating to maintenance and production
work that it had entered into even though these subcontracting deci-
sions affected union workers.62 The facts in Westinghouse are some-
what reversed from those in Fibreboard. In Fibreboard, the com-
pany sought to replace existing union workers with nonunion
workers. In Westinghouse, the union sought to replace existing non-
union subcontracted workers with union employees in an effort to
prevent displacement and to promote job security for employees al-
ready engaged in some maintenance and production work for the
company. The union felt that the employer had a duty to notify it
and to discuss the feasibility of using these bargaining unit employ-
ees to perform additional work, before the employer could contract
out for it. The employer, on the other hand, contended that it was
not obligated to bargain with the union over this subject. The NLRB
found merit in the employer's position and held that there was no
duty to bargain over subcontract decisions where the employer's de-
cisions satisfy five criteria: (1) they are motivated solely by economic
considerations; (2) they comport with traditional methods by which
the employer conducted his business operations; (3) they do not vary
significantly in. kind or degree from what is customary under past
established practice; (4) they have no demonstrable adverse impact
on the employees in the unit; and (5) the union has the opportunity
to bargain about changes in existing subcontracting practices at the
general negotiating meeting."' Because the employer in Westing-
house satisfied these criteria, the Board dismissed the union's
60. See supra note 46.
61. 150 N.L.R.B. 1574 (1965).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1577.
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complaint.6 '
On facts similar to Fibreboard, the NLRB in Marriott Corpo-
ration"' held that an employer had violated his duty to bargain con-
cerning his decision to subcontract.66 The four factors the Board took
into consideration in that case were: (1) the nature of the employer's
business before and after the decision to subcontract (change in oper-
ation); (2) the basis for the decision (motivation); (3) the ability of
the union to engage in meaningful bargaining in view of the em-
ployer's situation and objectives (past history of success in area); and
(4) the extent of capital expenditures.67 The first three factors con-
sidered by the NLRB in Marriott Corporation resemble the test es-
tablished in Fibreboard. However, the NLRB did not exempt the
decision from bargaining simply because it involved capital invest-
ments in the form of capital assets. The NLRB set forth a fourth
criterion which was to consider the extent of the capital expendi-
tures.66 In Marriott Corporation, the capital transactions "while not
de minimus, occurred at a leisurely pace ... ."0' As a result of this
"lack of immediacy" of the capital transactions, the NLRB required
that the decision be a subject of bargaining. This "lack of immedi-
acy" is similarly important to the dispute over decision-bargaining
concerning robots. In Marriott, the employer was not seeking to im-
plement new technology to increase productivity through the use of
investment capital, but was attempting to sell the unwanted machin-
ery.70 Unlike the decision to implement robotics, the immediate sale
of a capital asset does not increase the productivity of the employer.
The implementation of robotics, however, is a capital transaction in-
volving the purchase of a capital asset that attempts to achieve man-
agement's goal of increasing the productivity of the company and
reducing overall costs as quickly as possible. Therefore, unlike the
Marriott situation, delay of an employer's decision to install robotics
could have a profound negative effect on the employer's business as a
whole.71 The capital investment decision to purchase robotics re-
64. Id.
65. 264 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1982).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1370.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1371.
70. Id. at 1370-71.
71. Also, the sale of the machinery in Marriott was only an incidental effect of manage-
ment's decision to subcontract. The employers in Marriott could have decided not to sell their
capital assets and still could have effectuated the decision to subcontract. But an employer's
decision to utilize robotics is not merely incidental to the goal of increased productivity and
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quires immediacy of action to increase productivity and to decrease
costs, and, consequently, would be implicitly immune from the
mandatory bargaining requirement of section 8(d) of the Act under
Marriott rationale.
The federal circuit courts have not been uniform in enforcing
Board decisions in the subcontracting area. For example, in NLRB
v. Adam's Dairy,7 the court reversed the Board by holding that the
employer need not bargain with the union over subcontracting.73
The court distinguished Adam's Dairy from Fibreboard by conclud-
ing that the employer had made a basic operational change in his
business74 and did not just replace workers as was the case in
Fibreboard. A basic operational change was also found in Local
777, Democratic Union Organizing Committee v. NLRB. In that
case, the employer's decision excluded the subcontract from
mandatory bargaining. Moreover, courts have upheld Board deter-
minations that employers need not bargain with the union over sub-
contracting decisions where those decisions do not divert or destroy
jobs performed by bargaining unit employees.76
B. Relocation of Work Premises
Three cases dealt directly with a situation in which the em-
ployer sought to close one facility that employed union labor and to
transfer operations to a second facility that was nonunion, simply to
decrease labor costs. 7 In International Ladies Garment Workers
Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 78 the court affirmed the Board's deter-
mination that relocation of a business to defray labor costs was a
reduced costs. To accomplish this goal, management must directly invest its capital funds in
the purchase of robotics or other labor-saving machinery. Therefore, the purchase of robotics is
directly related to the employer's aim.
72. 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 463 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (company's decision to institute cab leasing pro-
gram). See also U.A.A.A.I.W. v. NLRB, 381 F.2d 265 (D.C Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 857 (1967).
76. Western Massachusetts Electric Co. v. NLRB, 573 F.2d 101 (1st Cir. 1978). See
also Japan Air Lines v. IAM, 538 F.2d 46 (2nd Cir. 1978). This situation is analogous to the
facts articulated in Westinghouse, supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
77. Int'l Ladies Garment Workers Union AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Los Angeles Marine Hardware, 235 N.L.R.B. 720 (1978), enfd, 602 F.2d 1302
(9th Cir. 1979); Illinois Coil Spring Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Mil-
waukee Spring 11.
78. 463 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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mandatory subject of bargaining.79 The court found that the scope of
the business enterprise as a whole was not altered; no significant
change in its capital structure was involved and the size of the work
force was a matter "particularly suitable to the collective bargaining
framework . . .-.
In Los Angeles Marine Hardware,8" the employer moved a
portion of its business from unionized to nonunionized facilities
without union consent even though the union and the employer were
parties to a collective bargaining agreement. Both the NLRB and the
court held that the employer was bound by the terms of the existing
contract, and could not relocate despite its need to obtain economic
relief from the terms of the agreement.8" The Board reasoned that
"the mandate of section 8(d) (that one party's proposed modification
of a contract can be implemented only if the other party consents) is
not excused by either subjective good faith or by . .. economic
necessity."83
In a third case, Milwaukee Spring I,84 the NLRB relied on Los
Angeles Marine Hardware and ordered the employer to rescind his
mid-contract decision to transfer his assembly operations to a nonun-
ion facility, even though the union had previously refused tomake
concessions to reduce labor costs. 85 Two years later, however, a
newly-composed Board granted rehearing8 and reversed its deci-
sion. 87 The current Board88 declared in Milwaukee Spring II, that
its ruling would ease the unforeseen economic strains which could
burden employers during the course of a collective bargaining agree-
ment.89 In addition, the Board concluded that its holding would "en-
courage the realistic and meaningful collective bargaining that the
79. Id.
80. Id. The company continued to lease the premises, to manufacture similar products
using the same machinery, and to sell products to the same customers, etc. Id. at 619.
81. 235 N.L.R.B. 720 (1978), enforced, 602 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1979).
82. Id. at 735, 602 F.2d at 1307.
83. Id.
84. 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982).
85. Id. at 210.
86. Chairman of the NLRB, Donald Dotson, expressed regret that when the Milwaukee
Spring issue first arose, the Board did not grant the kind of consideration to the matter that it
deserved. He acknowledged that it is not often that the agency asks that a case be sent back
from an appeals court for further consideration. 114 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 61, 62 (Sept. 26,
1983).
87. 268 N.L.R.B. 87 (1984) [hereinafter cited in text as Milwaukee Spring 11.
88. The Board members who provided the majority in this 3-1 decision were all appoin-
tees of President Reagan.
89. 268 N.L.R.B. 87 (1984).
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(National Labor Relations) Act contemplates."90
There are similarities between employers' decisions to relocate
and decisions to implement robotics. Similarities can be found be-
tween the effect on the employee through job termination and the
employer's motivation for these layoffs. In relocation cases, the em-
ployer seeks ways to reduce his labor costs. One way to achieve this
result is to relocate from a union to a nonunion facility since union
benefits and wages are considerably more expensive. Another method
to reduce labor costs would be the implementation of robotics to re-
place more costly and less efficient human workers.
The reversal of Milwaukee Spring I is extremely important be-
cause it is indicative of a possible pro-management trend in future
Board decisions. It is noteworthy that there has been a shift away
from the pro-union rationale espoused by the NLRB in Los Angeles
Marine Hardware and Milwaukee Spring I, to one that is pro-man-
agement. The decisions of the Board on employer relocation situa-
tions, and those of the courts in the partial termination cases which
follow, indicate an anti-union atmosphere that management and la-
bor will likely encounter in future legal controversies concerning
"robotization."
C. Partial Termination of a Portion of a Business
Partial closure of an employer's business can range from discon-
tinuing part of an operation within a plant to a full-size shut down
of one of the company's locations. The effect of any type of partial
closure on employment, however, is usually the same-large-scale
job termination. Decisions to partially terminate an existing busi-
ness, unlike the subcontracting decisions discussed above, have an
impact not only on employees, but on the company's capital assets
and investments as well. This is because the old capital assets91 will
90. Our holding today avoids this dilemma and will encourage the realistic and
meaningful collective bargaining that the Act contemplates. Under our decision,
an employer does not risk giving a union veto power over its decision regarding
relocation and should therefore be willing to disclose all factors affecting its
decision and, consequently the union will be in a better position to evaluate
whether to make concessions. Because both parties will no longer have an incen-
tive to refrain from frank bargaining, the likelihood that they will be able to
resolve their differences is greatly enhanced.
268 N.L.R.B. 87 (1984).
91. Capital assets or "fixed capital" are funds invested in relatively fixed long-term as-
sets like the plant building itself and equipment. "Working capital" refers to cash and short-
term cash investments which provide funds for purchase of inventory and payment of wages.
For a comprehensive analysis of the fixed/working capital distinction in the context of a
19841
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be sold off and the funds will be re-invested in other areas in order
to decrease costs and to increase company productivity overall.92
Partial termination decisions, as mentioned previously, more
closely concern the employer's choice of where and how to reallocate
his or her capital investments in order to reduce labor costs. This
reallocation usually represents a "significant change in operations,"9
and thus these partial termination/capital investment decisions are
considered to be strictly within the employer's entrepreneurial con-
trol.9 ' The decision to implement robotics is also one which involves
the investment of capital. Since these two situations are similar, the
holdings of the Board and the courts regarding bargaining over a
decision to partially terminate a business can be used as precedent to
determine whether the employer who implements robotics has a
mandatory duty to bargain with the union over this decision.
1. Confusion in the Courts: The Early Cases
Courts of appeal are divided on the issue of an employer's duty
to bargain over a decision to partially terminate its business. Cases
from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals illustrate the factors the
courts weigh when considering the issue, as well as the chronic dis-
parity in the amount of weight accorded to each. In NLRB v. Royal
Plating and Polishing,9 the court held that the employer had no
duty to bargain with the union over its decision to close down one of
its locations, although it did have to bargain over the effect of that
decision." The court distinguished the case before it from
Fibreboard by emphasizing that the instant decision involved man-
agement prerogative predicated on strictly economic justifications,9"
partial closing by an employer, see Comment, Partial Terminations-A Choice Between Bar-
gaining Equality and Economic Efficiency, 14 UCLA L. REV. 1089 (1967).
92. In Marriott, the Board reversed the Administrative Law Judge's determination that
the discontinuance of the employer's shrimp processing operation constituted a partial termina-
tion of the business because it involved the sale of capital assets. Instead, the Board held that
this was a subcontracting decision. This is because both before and after the employer's deci-
sion to contract out its shrimp processing, the employer was still engaged in its primary busi-
ness of providing prepared foods (including.shrimp) to its customers. This fact, combined with
the lack of an immediate necessity to reallocate its capital funds, indicated to the Board that
the situation was more properly analogized to subcontracting decisions than to classic partial
termination situations. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
93. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 213-14.
94. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
95. 350 F.2d 191 (3rd Cir. 1965).
96. Id. at 196.
97. "The decision ... involved a management decision to recommit and reinvest funds
in the business . . . [it] involved a major change in the economic direction of the Company."
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and concluded that under those circumstances, the employer was not
required to bargain with the union over its decision to partially close
down." Further, the court in Royal Plating articulated three distin-
guishable factors which did not mandate labor-management bargain-
ing: (1) the involvement of capital reinvestment; (2) the contempla-
tion of a major change in the economic direction of the company; and
(3) the high degree of economic necessity of the employer.""
The Third Circuit reversed its position100 thirteen years later in
Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB.1"1 The court began its analysis in
that case by explicitly rejecting what it called the "per se" rule ar-
ticulated in Royal Plating-"that an employer need never bargain
about an economically-based decision to close one of its facilities. 10"
Instead, the court espoused five reasons why an employer should
bargain with the union over its decision to partially close its busi-
ness.103 First, it would further the aims of collective bargaining as
contemplated by the NLRA by promoting discussion and compro-
mise between the parties. Second, termination of employment is a
"condition of employment" and is therefore mandatory by the terms
of the Act. Third, the union may be able to avert the closing through
concessions as to wages, benefits, etc. Fourth, because about one-
fourth of all agreements contain references to bargaining with regard
to plant closings and removals, this is indicative of the type of subject
which is amenable to collective bargaining. And fifth, it is not neces-
sarily shown without evidence to the contrary that imposing a duty
Id.
98. "[A]n employer faced with the economic necessity of either moving or consolidating
the operations of a failing business has no duty to bargain with the union respecting its deci-
sion to shut down." Id. Cf Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263
(1965) (employer's refusal to bargain over termination and liquidation of entire business, even
if motivated by union animus, is not an unfair labor practice under NLRA § 8(a)(5)).
99. Other courts of appeal followed the Royal Plating holding that an employer had no
duty to bargain regarding the decision to partially terminate a business. See NLRB v. Adam's
Dairy, 350 F.2d 108 (8th. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966) (change in opera-
tions); Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976) (economic reasons);
NLRB v. Thompson Transport Co., 406 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1969) (economic reasons);
NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967) (greatly changed
economic conditions); NLRB v. Int'l Harvester, 618 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1980) (economic
reasons).
100. Courts of appeal in other circuits had refused to follow the Royal Plating ration-
ale. See NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 361 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 935 (1966) (employer must bargain even though decision based on economic reasons);
Weltronc Co. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970)
(employer has duty to bargain).
101. 582 F.2d 720 (1978).
102. Id. at 732.
103. Id. at 734-38.
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to bargain on the employer would "necessarily strip [him or her] of
management prerogative . . . or impinge on the employer's freedom
ultimately to determine whether to close the facility. ' 10 4 Thus,
Brockway created an initial presumption that a partial closing was a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining which could be overcome
only if it appeared that the employer's interests outweighed those of
the union.1 05
2. Resolution of the Controversy: The First National Mainte-
nance Case
The controversy over the issue of whether the decision to par-
tially terminate a business is a mandatory bargaining subject, finally
attracted the attention of the United States Supreme Court in First
National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB.'0 In a 7-2 decision, the
Court held that "although the employer, who was engaged in the
business of providing housekeeping, cleaning, maintenance and re-
lated services for commercial customers, was required to bargain
about the effect of its decision to terminate a contract for economic
reasons with one of its commercial customers; the employer had no
duty to bargain with the union as to the decision itself."'0 7 The
Court rejected the first element of the Brockway analysis concerning
the initial presumption of an employer's duty to bargain, but never-
theless essentially adopted the balancing approach of the second part
of the Brockway test."08 The Court reasoned that the benefits of col-
lective bargaining over the decision to partially terminate a business
must be weighed against the burdens that bargaining imposes on the
employer.1 9 The Court concluded that the employer's burden in
104. Id.
105. ABC Trans-National Transport v. NLRB, 642 F.2d 675 (3rd Cir. 1981). See also
Midland-Ross Co. v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 977 (3rd Cir. 1980); Equitable Gas Co. v. NLRB, 637
F.2d 980 (3rd Cir. 1981). Like the courts of appeal, the NLRB itself has not been consistent
in its rulings on this subject. Compare National Car Rental System, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 159
(1980) (no employer duty to bargain) and Summit Tooling Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 479 (1972) (no
employer duty to bargain) with Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966) (employer has
duty to bargain).
106. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
107. 452 U.S. 666 (emphasis added).
108. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
109. In view of an employer's need for unencumbered decision-making in the
conduct of its business, bargaining over management decisions that have a sub-
stantial impact on the continued availability of employment should be required
only if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective-bargaining
process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business.
452 U.S. 666.
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these cases is too great and thus employers do not have a mandatory
duty to bargain over these decisions, but only over their effects on the
bargaining unit.110
3. The Rationale of First National Maintenance
There are six reasons why the Supreme Court rejected
mandatory bargaining over partial closing situations. First, because
the union's objective in bargaining is to delay or to halt the closing to
prevent lost jobs, this interferes with the speed and flexibility re-
quired for management to effect its business decisions.' Second, the
publicity which is incidental to the bargaining process undermines
the need for secrecy required in some business decisions."' Third,
unions could use this delay tactic as a powerful economic weapon to
achieve other goals unrelated to the closing situation."' Fourth, cur-
rent labor practices indicate that bargaining over decisions of this
kind are not the norm."" Fifth, labor costs may not be the primary
motivation for the economic decision, and it would be difficult for the
employer to know in advance how much economic necessity he was
experiencing and in what areas. As a result, the employer would be
uncertain whether his economic needs were compelling enough to
avoid both decision-bargaining with the union and possible unfair
labor practice violations." 5 Lastly, the Court distinguished the case
from other partial termination cases in two respects: (1) the em-
ployer did not seek to modify an existing collective bargaining agree-
ment," 6 and (2) the employer's decision did not involve large
amounts of investment capital.""
110. Id. at 688. Justice Brennan's dissent, joined by Justice Marshall, rejected as un-
substantiated the Majority's assertion that bargaining over the decision to partially close a
business would overburden the employer. In contrast, the dissent pointed to the recent experi-
ence of Chrysler Corp. In that situation, the collective bargaining process was successful in
bringing about concessions in compensation and benefits which contributed to prevent Chyr-
sler's partial closing.
111. Id. at 682-83.
112. Id. at 678-79.
113. "Labeling this type of decision mandatory could afford a union a powerful tool for
achieving delay, a power that might be used to thwart management's intentions in a manner
unrelated to any feasible solution the union might propose." Id.
114. Id. at 684.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 688. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
117. Id. at 688. The Court believed that the absence of "significant investment or with-
drawal of capital [was] not crucial." However, "[T]he decision to halt work at this specific
location represented a significant change in petitioner's operations, a change not unlike open-
ing a new line of business or going out of business entirely." Id.
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In addition, the holding of First National Maintenance may be
indicative of a trend toward favoring management interests because
the Court rejected the pro-union stance of Brockway which required
the employer to bargain with the union over the managerial decision
to partially shut down. " ' This pro-management trend, if continued,
may permit an employer to make a managerial decision such as ro-
botization without bargaining over it with the union.
D. Automation in the Workplace
Since robotics is a form of automation, a discussion of cases
dealing with this subject is useful in analyzing the employer's duty to
bargain in robotics situations. Unfortunately, there have been rela-
tively few cases dealing With the employer's duty to bargain over
decisions to introduce new technology or automation in the work-
place. " 9 Five cases which do address the issue involve a technologi-
cal change in the process of printing newspapers. 20
In Renton News Record, 2' the Board noted that the employers
were faced with a choice between economic destruction and changing
their method of operation.'22 The Board concluded that because im-
plementing the technological change was economically necessary, the
employers should only be required to bargain with the union over
the effects' 23 of their implementation decision.' 4 The federal courts
have also upheld Board determinations requiring effects-only bar-
118. The Board has deferred to the First National Maintenance approach in recent
decisions. See Swift & Co., 264 N.L.R.B. 240 (1982); Liberal Market, 264 N.L.R.B. 807
(1982).
119. The Court in First National Maintenance specifically refused to address this issue.
"We of course intimate no view as to other types of management decisions, such as plant
relocation, sales, and other kinds of subcontracting, automation, etc. which are to be considered
on their particular facts." 452 U.S. at 686 n.22 (emphasis added).
120. Renton News Record, 136 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1962); NLRB v. Columbia Tribune
Publishing Co., 495 F.2d 1384 (1974); Omaha Typographical Union v. NLRB, 545 F.2d
1138 (1976); Newspaper Printing Corp. v. NLRB, 625 F.2d 956 (1980); Island Typogra-
phers, 252 N.L.R.B. 9 (1980).
121. 136 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1962).
122. "Respondents were faced with the choice of either changing their method of opera-
tions to one at least equal to that of their competitors, or being forced to go out of business.
They selected the former alternative." Id. at 1297-98.
123. Bargaining over the effects of a decision requires management and labor to come to
some agreement regarding what will happen to those individuals affected by the implemented
decision. In the case of workers who were laid off due to the implementation of automated
equipment, bargaining topics may include such items as termination pay, retraining programs,
seniority status, etc.
124. Id. at 1298. See also Island Typographers, 252 N.L.R.B. 9 (1980) (employer did
not violate NLRA when it introduced new technological process-but violation found when
worker layoffs occurred as a result of implementation).
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gaining in similar cases. 125
Like the decision to automate, the decision to implement robot-
ics is one that directly affects the employer's productivity and his
ability to remain in business.12 6 Therefore, because mandatory bar-
gaining with the union is required only over the effects of automa-
tion on the bargaining unit, and not over the decision itself, the logi-
cal conclusion is that bargaining should only be required over the
effects of decisions to implement robotics.12
IV. REJECTION OF ROBOTICS AS A MANDATORY SUBJECT OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
A. Balancing the Interests at Stake
Recurring factors considered in the previous cases aid the analy-
sis of whether mandatory bargaining over the decision to implement
robotics is necessary. These major factors are: (1) the involvement
and extent of any capital investments; (2) any alteration or change in
an employer's operation and scope of enterprise; (3) the amenability
of the subject to the collective bargaining process; (4) the custom and
practice within the industry with regard to bargaining on the partic-
ular subject; and (5) the economic necessity and motivation of the
employer. By weighing each of these factors, a determination may be
made as to whether an employer's decision to implement robotics
should be considered a mandatory subject of collective bargaining be-
tween management and labor.
B. Analysis of Factors Applicable to Robotics Implementation
Situations
1. Involvement and Extent of Capital Investments
The involvement and extent of capital investments/assets in an
employer's business decision has always been perceived by the Board
and the courts as within the realm of strict managerial control. Capi-
tal investments involve ownership/property rights of the employer
regarding how and when to expend corporate funds. Conversely, em-
ployees do not have any property rights in their jobs. Therefore,
125. NLRB v. Columbia Tribune Pub. Co., 495 F.2d 1384 (1974); Omaha Typograph-
ical Union v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 1138 (1976); Newspaper Printing Corp. v. NLRB, 625 F.2d
956 (1980).
126. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
127. One commentator has suggested the opposite view. See Note, Automation and Col-
lective Bargaining, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1822 (1971).
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these employees should not participate in the decision-making pro-
cess of how, when and on what the employer's corporate funds
should be spent. Decisions such as Fibreboard,"2 8 Marriott,29 Royal
Plating30 and First National Maintenance.3 have held that the
presence and extent of an employer's capital investments is an im-
portant factor in evaluating whether the employer had a mandatory
duty to bargain over decisions to subcontract or to close an operation,
even though those decisions would affect employment. Logically,
then, had capital investment expenditures been found in Fibreboard,
the Court might have reached the opposite conclusion than it did,
and held that the duty to bargain over subcontracting decisions was
permissive-not mandatory." 2
Furthermore, First National Maintenance held that the em-
ployer did not have a duty to decision-bargain with the union even
though no capital assets were involved.' Because the Court held
that the employer had no duty to decision-bargain without the pres-
ence of capital investment expenditures, a decision to implement
robotics, which does involve the expenditure of capital investments,
would most certainly be held to be outside the scope of mandatory
collective bargaining under an extension of the First National Main-
tenance rationale. In addition, the immediacy factor, previously ar-
ticulated in Marriott,"" would support the implementation of robot-
ics without mandatory collective bargaining, because increased
productivity is necessary in our sagging American economy.
2. Alteration or Change in Employer's Operation and Scope
of Enterprise
The alteration of a business through the implementation of
robotics is analogous to those alterations that courts have recently
128. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
129. 264 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1982).
130. 350 F.2d 191 (3rd Cir. 1965).
131. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
132. Decisions concerning the commitment of investment capital and the basic
scope of the enterprise, are not in themselves primarily about conditions of em-
ployment, though the effect of the decision may be necessarily to terminate em-
ployment. If, as I think clear, the purpose of § 8(d) is to describe a limited area
subject to the duty of collective bargaining, those management decisions which
are fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise or which im-
pinge only indirectly upon employment security should be excluded from that
area.
379 U.S. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
133. 452 U.S. at 688.
134. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
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held do not trigger the employer's duty to decision-bargain with the
union. The Court in Fibreboard held that the employer had a duty
to bargain because the decision to subcontract by replacing one set of
workers with another did not involve a major change in the em-
ployer's mode of operation."' In contrast, implementing robotics ne-
cessitates a complete restructuring of an employer's operation " ' be-
cause it literally revolutionizes all aspects of a business. This weighs
against union intervention in the decision-bargaining process.
First National Maintenance also gave great weight to the fact
that the employer's decision to close a portion of his business brought
about a significant change in its operations. " ' The implementation
of a robotics system, like a partial shut down, would represent a
drastic change in the employer's operations.133 Therefore, since par-
tial closure situations are analogous to robotization, the rationale in
First National Maintenance indicates that there should be no re-
quirement of mandatory bargaining over a robotics-type deci-
sion-only over its effects.
3. Amenability of Subject to Collective Bargaining
At first glance, it seems logical that management's duty to bar-
gain collectively with the union should increase as the amount of
anticipated change in an employer's business increases. However,
management should actually have a greater duty to bargain with the
union as the degree of anticipated economic change in the workplace
decreases. This is because the smaller the economic change or prob-
lem in the workplace, the greater the ability of the parties will be to
effectuate concessions and to reach agreements. This is because there
is less distance between the employer and the unions and thus eco-
nomic concessions have less financial impact on either side. Con-
versely, the larger the problem, the more difficult it is for labor and
management to agree because the economic impact of concessions is
greater to both parties. Robotics is the type of large-scale change that
would not be amenable to the collective bargaining process. Because
135. 379 U.S. at 213.
136. Automation may involve drastic alterations of production methods, thus af-
fecting the entire physical operation far more than subcontracting existing jobs.
A decision to automate may involve greater input of managerial effort in plan-
ning and execution than would a decision to subcontract; it may also cause an
initial period of under-production until the new methods are adequately
integrated.
Note, supra note 127, at 1837.
137. 452 U.S. at 688.
138. Note, supra note 127.
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the impact of robotics on reducing labor costs and increasing produc-
tivity is so great, unions would be financially unable to make
counter-proposals that would effectively deter management's deci-
sion. Programmable automation is simply more cost-efficient than
union labor even with union concessions in wages, hours and bene-
fits. Therefore, the only foreseeable effect that bargaining over the
issue will have is increased delay in robotics implementation. This
delay can be translated into an employer's lost revenues or, at an
extreme, loss of business. These burdens are too great to impose on
the employer.
In this respect, the rationale of the Court in First National
Maintenance with regard to partial closure cases applies with even
greater force to a robotics case. The majority in First National
Maintenance concluded that the benefits of decision-bargaining sim-
ply did not outweigh the burden placed on the employer."' From an
economic standpoint, the parties in a partial termination situation
are often closer than those in a robotics situation. 4
Arguably, a small-scale robotization, in which huge numbers of
workers are not affected, may prove amenable to the collective bar-
gaining process. However, imposing this rationale would be unfair
because it would impose a greater burden on smaller companies than
larger corporations. The implementation of a robotics system in a
small company would proceed slowly because smaller companies can
generally only afford small capital expenditures. Thus the foresee-
able effects of robotics on the displaced employees of a small com-
pany may be small. But requiring the employer of a small company
to bargain with the union over this decision, simply because his or
her situation is more amenable to collective bargaining since the par-
ties' bargaining positions are closer, would penalize the employer for
having a small business. This is because large corporations that are
financially capable of implementing robotics on a large scale and
thus creating a greater job displacement, would be excluded from
mandatory decision-bargaining because the financial gap between
management and the union would be too enormous to effectuate
meaningful concessions. Moreover, in order to decide whether an
employer is required to decision-bargain, the employer must deter-
mine the extent of capital investments, the impact on employees, and
the economic gap between himself and the union. These calculations
would be virtually impossible as well as overly burdensome. Im-
139. 452 U.S. at 679.
140. This belief is evidenced by the Chrysler success story. See supra note 110.
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proper categorization of the employer's business may result in the
employer committing an unfair labor practice. Consequently, the eq-
uitable alternative would be to exclude all robotics decisions from
the statutory duty to bargain and thus allow the employer the mana-
gerial discretion necessary to achieve a successful and profitable busi-
ness through robotization.
4. Custom and Practice Within the Industry
As stated previously, there have been no cases directly dealing
with the issue of whether robotics should be considered a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining. However, the few cases which con-
cern the implementation of automation hold that the effects of the
decision to automate on the bargaining unit is a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining.'" Thus, the company had a statutory duty to
confer in good faith with the union over the ramifications of this
issue, but not over the decision itself.'42 These case precedents, com-
bined with the holding in First National Maintenance,'43 compel
the conclusion that management's mandatory duty to bargain over
robotics implementation should be confined to bargaining over its ef-
fects on the employees in the bargaining unit. To do otherwise
would place an excessive burden on the employer.
5. Economic Necessity and Motivation of the Employer
As stated in Royal Plating, an employer company does not have
to bargain with the union concerning its decisions to shut down its
business and thus terminate employees when it is faced with eco-
nomic necessity.144 In the future, the implementation of program-
mable automation, such as robots, may become an economic necessity
for the employer if he or she wishes to remain competitive and con-
tinue in business. 45 It can be argued that the employer's motivation
for the installation of robotics may be to "bust" the union. However,
the union's legitimate interest in fair dealing is protected by section
8(a)(3) which prohibits the employer from terminating any employ-
ees if motivated by union animus."' Therefore, if it can be shown
that the objective of purchasing robots is specifically to undermine
141. See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
142. Id.
143. 452 U.S. at 682-83, 686-87.
144. 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3rd Cir. 1965).
145. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 42.
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the union, the action would be an unfair labor practice under the Act
and the decision to implement the robots would be void. " 7
Furthermore, the Board's recent reversal of its decision in Mil-
waukee Spring I recognizes the argument that the employer's need to
reduce labor costs is a legitimate one.'48 In fact, the Board finds this
need so compelling that it permits the employer to relocate without
union consent from a union facility to a nonunion facility mid-con-
tract in order to effectuate these cost savings.' 9 Like relocation,
robotics is another means of reducing labor costs. Therefore, under
the rationale of Milwaukee Spring H, the employer's decision to im-
plement robotics should also be classified as compelling, thereby
eliminating it as a subject for mandatory decision-bargaining.
C. Mandatory Bargaining over Effect of Decision to Implement
Robotics
All agree that the robot revolution will adversely affect employ-
ment. The robotization controversy involves the degree or amount of
job displacement that will occur. Because the amount of robotics im-
plementation in different industries and companies will differ, so too
will the impact of automation. It is over this area of the impact or
effect of management's decision to use robots that meaningful collec-
tive bargaining should take place. Once the decision to invest in
robotics has been made, it should be mandatory that management
negotiate with labor as to the best method to deal with the displace-
ment of the company's workers. Both the NLRB and the courts have
held in automation implementation cases that management has a
mandatory duty to bargain only over the effects of its decisions to
introduce new technology.' 50 The Supreme Court's ruling in First
National Maintenance indicates a trend toward mandatory effects-
only bargaining in situations where labor is displaced due to man-
agement decisions."5' The issue of whether or not to implement a
robotics system of production is analogous to a decision to partially
terminate a business because both decisions involve capital invest-
ment and/or reallocations and the result of each situation is unem-
147. See Richland, Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 91 (1969) (discriminatory motive behind auto-
mating worker's job held an unfair labor practice); Weston & Brooker Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 747
(1965), enforced per curiam, 373 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1967) (elimination of worker's job due to
automation subcontracting decision, motivated by union animus, held an unfair labor practice).
148. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
149. Id.
150. See supra note 123.
151. 452 U.S. at 688.
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ployment. Thus, the rationale and holding of First National Main-
tenance can be logically extended to apply to robotics
implementation situations also. Because the employer in a partial
termination case is required to bargain with the union solely con-
cerning the effects of the closure, an employer in a robotics imple-
mentation situation should only be required to bargain regarding the
effects of the implementation.
Like the Supreme Court, the NLRB's apparent trend as evi-
denced by its reversal of its original pro-union stand in Milwaukee
Spring I, indicates that employers will be allowed more deference in
management decisions in cases involving economic factors and con-
siderations.' 52 Because the decision to implement robotics is a mana-
gerial decision predicated on economic considerations, any future
robotics cases which come before the NLRB and the present Court
will likely be accorded pro-management treatment similar to that in
Milwaukee Spring II and First National Maintenance. Therefore,
by extending the pro-management rationale in these two cases to a
robotics implementation case, it appears that management will not
be required to bargain over this decision, but only over its effects on
the bargaining unit.
Mandatory bargaining over the effects of introducing robots to
business will be the keystone for achieving good industrial relations
between management and labor. Timely notice to the union of the
determination to implement robotics is essential to promote an effi-
cient and smooth transition from human to automated labor. Pre-
implementation notification will insure minimal union resentment by
opening channels of communication and providing an atmosphere
conducive to meaningful collective bargaining. This was the goal
Congress had in mind when it enacted the National Labor Relations
Act. This type of communication cannot be fostered if the union re-
ceives notice of an employer's decision one hour before the robots
march in. A signed contract to purchase robotics would be evidence
of the employer's binding decision to implement robotics. It should
be at this time, or within a reasonable time thereafter, that the em-
ployer should have a mandatory obligation to notify the union of its
decision and to begin effects-bargaining. Because the time between
the ordering of the machinery and its actual introduction in the
workplace is considerable, this is a reasonable notice period that
would not be overly burdensome to the union or to the employer in
their negotiations. Moreover, contract provisions concerning the im-
152. Milwaukee Spring Div. of I11. Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 87 (1984).
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pact and effects of technological change have already surfaced in col-
lective bargaining agreements.15 These provisions provide for such
things as employee retraining, interplant transfers, severance pay
and supplementary unemployment benefits.'"
In the case of robotics, employee retraining programs are the
most beneficial to the worker. This is because robots will eventually
replace most semi- and nonskilled workers in manufacturing,
thereby creating a class of individuals with negligible re-employment
prospects. Retraining these workers in areas not likely to be nega-
tively affected by robotics will assist them in becoming functioning
members of the labor force. Thus, retraining is a long-term solution,
unlike interplant transfers, severance pay, and supplemental unem-
ployment benefits which only assist the terminated worker for a rela-
tively short period of time. However, the brunt of employee retrain-
ing should not necessarily fall exclusively on the shoulders of the
employer." Congress should begin to address the need for viable
alternatives to unemployment resulting from robotization. 156
V. CONCLUSION
The era of programmable automation has already arrived,
bringing with it a myriad of social, economic and political questions
and problems. The implementation of robots into the workplace
poses a legal question as to the scope of mandatory collective bar-
gaining between labor and management under NLRA section 8(d).
The hybrid nature of robotics makes it analogous to those decisions
involving subcontracting, relocation, partial termination, and auto-
mation, because all of these situations involve employee displace-
ment. Requiring an employer to bargain with the union over the
decision to implement robotics would not only place a heavy burden
on the employer, but would be inconsistent with the current pro-
management trend of the NLRB and the courts. However,
mandatory collective bargaining over the effects of this type of deter-
153. "[S]uch provisions make up the bulk of current agreements which deal with auto-
mation." Note, supra note 127, at 1854.
154. id.
155. Because the employer is reducing labor costs by implementing robotics and he is
able to depreciate his machinery at the same time, perhaps requiring the employer to retrain
displaced employees might not be an undue burden in some cases. (If you re-tool, you retrain).
156. One possible solution might be a robotics tax whereby the employer would be as-
sessed a tax amount per implemented robot or number of employees it displaced. Total col-
lected funds could then be matched by the federal government for use in setting up and main-
taining retraining programs. Still another idea might be a tax write-off for the employer in the
amount spent in retraining displaced employees due to robotization.
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mination should be advocated by both of these judicial bodies in the
future. Bargaining over the effects of robotics is an area amenable to
collective bargaining and as such would effectuate the purpose of the
NLRA.
This comment has addressed the legal implications of the robot
revolution on the collective bargaining process. But as the social, eco-
nomic and political impact of robotics begins to be felt throughout
society, Congress needs to provide some assistance to buffer the fu-
ture repercussions that robotics will definitely thrust upon the al-
ready strained relationship between management and labor.
Debra J. Zidich

